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two experiments (N1 = 117 and N2 = 245) on reasoning with knowledge-rich conditionals showed 
a main effect of logical validity, which was due to the negative effect of counter-examples being 
smaller for valid than for invalid arguments. these findings support the thesis that some people 
tend to inhibit background inconsistent with the hypothetical truth of the premises, while others 
tend to abandon the implicit truth-assumption when they have factual evidence to the contrary. 
Findings show that adhering to the truth-assumption in the face of conflicting evidence to the 
contrary requires an investment of time and effort which people with a higher general aptitude 
are more likely to do.
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General IntroductIon
In recent discussion on the psychology of human thinking and reason-
ing it has been argued that theories that have focussed on reasoning 
under certainty (i.e., deductive reasoning) are incapable of being ex-
tended to reasoning under uncertainty (i.e., probabilistic reasoning). 
The “core argument” (Oaksford & Chater, 1998) is that common-sense 
reasoning is non-monotonic, whereas logic systems are monotonic: 
Once an inference is made that is logically valid, this inference remains 
logically valid. The validity of everyday inferences however would be 
revisable. For instance, almost everybody will at first accept the follow-
ing so-called Modus Ponendo Ponens argument (MP): If it is a bird, then 
it can fly; Tweety is a bird and, therefore, can fly. At the same time, when 
subsequently being told that Tweety is an ostrich, almost everybody 
will reject the original inference and will state that Tweety cannot fly. 
Such a presumed revision of the validity of an argument is beyond the 
scope of standard monotonic logics. 
Schroyens (2004, 2009, in press) argued however that some contro-
versies seem to be non-issues, which could have been avoided in the 
first place by considering the distinction between the defeasibility and 
non-monotonicity of an inference (see also Politzer & Braine, 1991). 
The double meaning of inference, as referring to both the entailment 
relation and that which is entailed, that is, the conclusion, has most 
likely contributed to the conceptual confusions. Monotonicity concerns 
the validity of inferences; defeasibility concerns the truth of conclusions 
and this “distinction between validity and truth … is basic to deductive 
logic [and] many people find the distinction difficult to grasp” (Glass & 
Holyoak, 1986, p. 338). The truth-value of a validly inferred conclusion 
is always a hypothetical truth, whereas the truth-value (i.e., falsity) of a 
defeated inference hinges on a factual truth, that is, our belief, at a par-
ticular moment in time and space that something is true in the “real” 
world.  Though they are closely linked, defeasible and non-monotonic 
inferences are not the same: The defeasibility of conclusions is a neces-
sary, but not a sufficient condition for the non-monotonic nature of AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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the arguments yielding that conclusion. Consider again our example of 
Tweety the flying ostrich.
The conclusion of the argument is false, but it cannot be rejected on 
logical grounds … What is wrong, of course, is that the claim that 
all birds can fly is true (Nickerson, 1986, p. 10).
The present study investigates the importance of the truth-assumption 
and the hypothetical nature of the truth of validly inferred conclu-
sions. 
  Research on meta-propositional reasoning about the truth or fal-
sity of propositional utterances (e.g., Rips, 1989, 1990) already provided 
evidence for the thesis that people start reasoning on the basis of the 
assumption that given information is true (see e.g., Schroyens, 1997; 
Schroyens, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 1996, 1999). The following is an 
example of such meta-propositional puzzles (akin to the well-known 
liar paradoxes): Walter says that if he speaks the truth then Jonathan is 
lying. Jonathan says: Walter is a liar. What is the status of Jonathan and 
Walter? Are they liars or truth-tellers? The type of errors people make 
and the ease of solving the meta-propositional reasoning puzzles are in 
line with the truth-assumption, which Schroyens (1997) and Schroyens 
et al. (1996, 1999) have referred to as the Gricean hypothesis:
Rips (1989, 1990), Johnson-Laird, and Byrne (1990, 1991) suppose 
that subjects start solving such knight-knave problems by making 
a hypothesis about the truth-status of one of the assertors in the 
problem. Moreover, they all ho1d the view that this starting hy-
pothesis generally is one whereby it is assumed that the person first 
mentioned in a problem is a truth-teller, which is in accordance 
with the maxims of Grice (1975). (Schroyens et al., 1996, p. 146)
Grice  (1975)  formulated  his  general  ”cooperative  principle”  for 
conversation and, echoing Kant’s synthetic a priori categories specified 
his cooperation maxims of Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Manner. 
Truth regards the Quality of a contribution that would follow “the 
supermaxim  ‘Try to make your contribution one that is true’ and two 
other more specific maxims: 1. Do not say what you believe to be false; 
2. Do not say for which you lack adequate evidence” (p. 46). Though 
performance on meta-propositional reasoning problems evidences the 
psychological reality of a Gricean truth-assumption, it does not inform 
us about the relation between deductive or logical validity and hypo-
thetical reasoning under the assumption of truth.
  Other studies have provided some insight into the relation be-
tween the truth-assumption and logical validity. Markovits (1995; see 
also Markovits & Schroyens, 2007; Markovits et al., 1996) confronted 
his participants with contrary-to-fact conditionals (e.g., “If I throw the 
feather into the window, it will break”) that were sometimes presented 
in a fantasy context. The fantasy context conveys a hypothetical world, 
and stimulates as such a hypothetical mode of thinking that allows one 
to dissociate factual knowledge (about our world) from hypothetical 
knowledge (in some other imaginary world enunciated by language). 
When the clearly false conditionals were presented in a fantasy context, 
the children were indeed more inclined to accept the logically valid MP 
arguments (as well as the Modus Tollens [MT] arguments introduced 
below). This shows that stimulating a hypothetical line of reasoning 
under the assumption that something is true increases deductive ra-
tionality. Deduction presumes such hypothetical reasoning under the 
hypothetical-truth assumption. The truth of deductively valid argu-
ments is thus always relative and never an absolute: “The deductions, 
in so far as they result from a correct process of reasoning, possess 
absolute validity only in reference to the same system of concepts to 
which the premises apply” (Shelton, 1912, pp. 80-81).
  Given the centrality of the Gricean truth-assumption and the hy-
pothetical nature of a conclusion’s truth in the notion of logical validity, 
we focus on the hypothesis that, at least to start with, people spontane-
ously make the assumption that the information they are given is true. 
The truth-assumption is a necessary component of deductively rational 
behaviour. Hence, if no evidence can be found that supports it, the idea 
that people can be (but do not need to be, cf. General Discussion sec-
tion) deductively rational seems untenable. To investigate the Gricean 
assumption of truth we make use of well-known content effects (a.k.a. 
belief bias) in conditional reasoning. We first introduce these content 
effects. 
Content effects                            
and the truth of an utterance 
Table 1 presents the most commonly studied conditional inference 
problems. These problems are formed by an affirmation or denial of 
the antecedent (A) or consequent (C) of the conditional utterance of 
the form if A then C. The propositional content of the conditional ut-
terance can be almost anything, for example:
  1. If you turn the key, then the car will start. 
  2. If you heat water to 100°C, then it will boil.
  3. If you push the brake, then the car will stop.
  4. If you jump into the swimming pool, then you’ll get wet.
The content effects with such realistic conditional-inference prob-
lems show that the reasoning process is strongly affected by the factual 
truth of the premises and/or conclusion (Politzer & Bourmaud, 2002; 
see also Byrne, 1989; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; De Neys, 
Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2003).
  The most robust content effects are counter-example effects. They 
reflect the effects of the number (and/or salience) of factual counter-
examples  to  the  standard  inferences.  For  instance,  the  conclusions 
for AC and DA (cf. Table 1) are falsified by situations that reflect the 
possibility that the antecedent is false (not A) while the consequent 
is nonetheless observed (C). When the conditional captures a causal 
statement, such not A and C cases reflect so-called alternative causes. 
For instance, when people generate alternatives for conditionals (1) 
and (2), they generally come up with relatively few of them as com-
pared to the number of alternatives for conditionals (3) and (4). The 
conclusions of MP and MT are countered by situations that represent 
the contingency where A is satisfied whereas C is not. When the con-
ditional enunciates a causal statement, such A and not C cases reflect 
exceptions to the rule (a.k.a. disabling conditions or disablers, which 
affect whether the antecedent is a sufficient condition for the conse-
quent to be the case). When people generate exceptions to the rules 
(1) and (3), they come up with a relatively high number of factors that 
might prevent the effect from occurring. For conditionals (2) and (4) AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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there are only few exceptions. The most robust finding in reasoning 
with realistic, causal conditionals is that people are less likely to accept 
MP/MT when there are many exceptions and are less likely to accept 
AC/DA when there are many alternatives. The hypothesis that people 
make the Gricean truth-assumption has some straightforward implica-
tions as regards the counter-example effects tested in Experiments 1 
and 2.
experIment 1
The present study investigated the relative size of counter-example 
effects on logically valid versus invalid arguments. The Gricean truth-
assumption implies that counter-example effects should be smaller for 
the valid as compared to the invalid arguments. If a conditional is taken 
to be true, the True-antencedent-False-consequent (TF) cases are im-
possible. This is not a matter of debate “All theories of the conditional 
agree that the only state of affairs that contradicts if the cat is happy 
then she purrs is a happy cat not purring (TF), and so all other cases are 
possible” (Evans, 2007, p. 54). Meta-analyses (Schroyens, 2010) firmly 
establish that TF cases are judged impossible or are judged to show a 
conditional rule is false. These same meta-analyses also establish that 
False-antecedent-True-consequent, FT cases are often judged possible 
when people are reasoning about possibilities given that the condi-
tional rule is true. Hence, for these cases there is no conflict between 
the  Gricean  truth-assumption  and  specific  background  knowledge 
about  FT  (not-A  and  C)  cases  (a.k.a.  alternative  causes  or,  in 
short,  alternatives).  It  follows  that  the  counter-example  effect 
for  the  invalid  arguments  (no  conflict  for  FT)  would  be  larger 
than the counter-example effect for the valid arguments (a conflict for 
TF). 
   Though many studies have looked at the effect of reasoning about 
knowledge-rich conditionals with few versus many exceptions and/or 
alternatives, it is striking to see that as far as we know no study ever 
made a direct comparison between size of the counter-example effects 
on the valid and invalid arguments. This type of interaction between 
logical validity and belief is indeed a robust phenomenon in the li-
terature on syllogistic reasoning (i.e., reasoning about subject-predicate 
expressions of the form All A are B, No A are B, some A are /not/ B; see 
e.g., Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993) and it has been used to conclude 
that reasoning cannot be completely belief-based. If conditional rea-
soning similarly shows an interaction between logic and belief, then 
this poses problems for probabilistic theories of conditional reasoning 
that reject the psychological reality of the distinction between logically 
valid versus invalid arguments and propose that reasoning is largely 
if not solely belief based. The conditional-probability theory indeed 
rejects the idea that people make the Gricean truth-assumption. 
  If people adhere to the truth-assumption, they need to inhibit 
background knowledge in the context of the valid arguments. Such 
an inhibitory process or conflict resolution is likely to put demands 
on limited processing resources (see e.g., Engle, Conway, Tuholski, & 
Shisler, 1995; Gorfein & Macleod, 2007). We thus expected that people 
with higher ability would be more able to do this. That is, first we ex-
pected to observe larger counter-example effects on the invalid versus 
valid arguments. Second, the smaller effect of many versus few counter-
examples on the valid arguments yields a main effect of logical validity. 
Third, the logical validity effect would be modulated by participants’ 
general ability. Participants with higher general ability would be more 
able to inhibit background knowledge and would thus be less likely to 
reject the logically valid arguments. Since there is no need to inhibit 
background knowledge in the case of the invalid arguments (as there is 
no conflict between the consequences of making the truth-assumption 
and this background knowledge), one does not expect general ability 
to modulate the logically invalid arguments. This holds provided that 
general ability is related to inhibition and is by itself not related to a 
larger knowledge base of potential counter-examples, that is, alterna-
tives to the antecedent-to-consequent relation described in the condi-
tional. But, this nuance does not affect the predicted interaction. If it is 
related to knowledge about alternatives, then general ability would also 
be positively related to a larger knowledge base of exceptions, which 
would need to be inhibited when following up the truth-assumption’s 
consequences in the context of valid arguments (but not the logically 
invalid arguments). 
Nomenclature Argument Counterexample
Logically valid
Modus Ponens MP A therefore C A and not-c
Modus Tollens MT Not-C therefore Not-A Not-C and a
Logically invalid
Affirmation of the consequent AC C therefore A C and not-a
Denial of the Antecedent DA Not-C therefore Not-A Not-A and c
tAble 1. 
standard logically valid or logically invalid Arguments About conditionals of the Form “if Antecedent (A) then consequent (c).”
Note. The counterexamples to the inferences are formed by the categorical premise in combination with the denial of 
the conclusion (in bold).AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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  Being able to inhibit background knowledge obviously does not 
imply one actually makes the effort of doing so (e.g., many people 
are capable of killing another person, but luckily enough this does 
not mean they do it). However, if we observe that people with higher 
ability actually inhibit background knowledge, then this presumes at 
least these people were actually attempting to do so. The increased size 
of the logical-validity effect would thus provide converging evidence 
for the thesis that in a communicative context like the one between 
an experimenter and participant, people spontaneously make the as-
sumption that speakers are providing true information by uttering the 
claims they make (Grice, 1975).
Method
ParticiPants 
Participants were 11th- and 12th-grade students (N = 117) at a 
secondary Flemish high school within the general education system 
preparing for higher education.
Material, Design, anD ProceDure
  Participants received a set of conditional inference problems with 
few or many counter-examples. The problems were either logically 
valid (MP, MT) or logically invalid.  Participants were classified as be-
ing of low, medium, or high aptitude on the basis of their raw scores on 
the Standard Raven Progressive Matrices.
  The conditional-inference problems were part of a larger battery 
of reasoning problems investigated to address other research questions.   
Participants first solved a set of 16 abstract propositional-reasoning 
problems about if, only if, or else, and unless. They then solved a set of 
12 abstract spatial-relation problems (e.g., “The pear is to the right of 
the kiwi, the kiwi is to the left of the tomato, the apple is in front of the 
kiwi, the lemon is in front of the tomato: What is the spatial relation 
between the apple and the lemon?”). For the purposes of the present 
study, these problems are considered filler items. The 11th- and 12th-
grade students are a subset of the complete number of participants. 
They served as the reference group for the study of developmental ef-
fects. That is, the entire study was run at all age high-school grades. The 
development of human reasoning falls beyond the scope of the present 
study and is not discussed here. 
Participants evaluated 32 arguments (MP, MT, AC, or DA), pre-
sented in the following format (translated from Dutch):
Rule: If John lies in the sun for a long time, then his skin will get 
burned.
Fact: John lies in the sun for a long time.
Conclusion: John’s skin is burned.
The  arguments  were  formed  on  the  basis  of  eight  knowledge-rich 
conditionals for which pilot studies have shown that they yield many 
or  few  disablers  and/or  alternatives  (see  Verschueren,  Schaeken, 
&  d’Ydewalle,  2005).  The  specific  conditionals  were  taken  from 
De Neys et al. (2002, 2003; cf. Appendix A), who classified the con-
ditionals as having few versus many alternatives and/or exceptions 
on the basis of a separate study. The problems were introduced as 
follows: 
We are interested in seeing how people reason with ordinary sen-
tences. In each of the following problem you are given a general 
rule and a fact. A conclusion is derived from this rule and given 
fact. It is your task to evaluate the conclusion. For each problem 
you have to indicate how certain you think it is that the conclusion 
follows from the rule and the given fact. 
Participants evaluated the conclusion on a symmetrical 7-point scale, 
ranging from very/somewhat uncertain to somewhat certain, certain, 
and very certain.  The scale was repeated with each of the numbered 
problems and participants crossed the appropriate column (A, B, etc. 
up to G) for the respective problems on a special-purpose answer 
sheet. The study was run in two sessions in the individual classrooms. 
During  the  first  session,  participants  solved  the  Standard  Raven 
Progressive Matrices (SRPM). The second session took place about a 
week later.
Results and discussion
The certainty ratings (1-7) were transformed to the [0, 1] probability 
interval and submitted to analyses of variance on the mean certainty 
ratings on the logically valid versus invalid inferences with few versus 
many counter-examples (see Figure 1). The counter-example effects 
reflect the effect of conditionals with many versus few alternatives 
on the logically invalid inferences (averaged over AC and DA), and 
the effect of many versus few exceptions on the logically valid infer-
ences (averaged over MP and MT). This implies that for the valid argu-
ments one averages across the frequency of alternatives, while for the 
invalid arguments one averages across the frequency of exceptions to 
the rules. For future reference in meta-analyses on the non-counter-
example effects, Appendix B (Table B1) presents the full set of results. 
A between-groups factor was formed by general ability, as measured 
by the Standard Raven Progressive Matrices. For 12 participants no 
SRPM score was obtained during Session 1. These participants, as well 
as five participants who had not solved all problems, were excluded 
from the analyses. The remaining 100 participants were split into three 
general aptitude groups (low: n = 32; medium: n = 41; high: n = 27) on 
the basis of the 33rd (SRPM = 54) and 66th percentile (SRPM = 58). 
The boundary cases with SPRM 54 and 58 were placed in the medium 
group. Other studies (see e.g., De Neys et al, 2005) have selected partici-
pants  on  a  similar  basis  to  increase  the  contrast  between  low 
and  high  ability,  without  even  retaining  the  medium  ability 
group.  The  maximum  raw  score  of  the  SRPM  is  60.  The  present 
subjects  group  showed  a  relatively  high  mean  score  of  54.54 
(SD = 4.51). 
   Figure 1 presents the mean certainty ratings as a function of 
logical validity, counter-example frequency, and general aptitude. It 
shows, first, the well-known counter-example effects, F(1, 97) = 258.1, 
MSE = .026, p < .000001. Both the valid and the invalid arguments 
were evaluated as less certain when there were many (vs. few) counter-
examples to the conclusions, .831 vs. .644, F(1, 97) = 133.3, MSE = .013,   
p < .00001; and .811 vs. .486, F(1, 97) =  228.8, MSE = .024,  p < .00001, 
respectively. More interesting for the present discussion is the interac-
tion  between  logical  validity  and  counter-example  frequency, AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
http://www.ac-psych.org 2010 • volume 6 • 88-102 92
F(1,  97)  =    49.2,  MSE  =  .011,    p  <  .00001.  Figure  1  shows  that 
the  counterexample  effect  on  the  valid  arguments  (.831  vs.  .644: 
d = .187) is smaller than the counterexample effect on the invalid argu-
ment (.811 vs. .486: d = .325). This finding corroborates the hypothesis 
that  people  make  the  Gricean  truth-assumption  and  consequently 
inhibit factual knowledge that conflicts with implications of this as-
sumption about cases that are (im)possible. 
  We conjectured that people higher in general ability might be 
more apt to inhibit background knowledge when such is needed. The 
interaction between general aptitude and logical validity did not reach 
statistical significance at the conventional level, though there was a 
strong tendency F(2, 97) =  2.8, MSE = .019,  p = .063. A statistically 
more powerful test does not hinge on testing an interaction between the 
decreased certainty ratings of the invalid arguments and the increased 
certainty ratings of the valid arguments. The opposing effects are in the 
same direction if one were to use logically correct responding as the 
dependent measure, which is a delicate matter since the label correct re-
flects an evaluative and/or normative stance towards human reasoning 
performance. In the following we will continue to use the term logically 
correct to annul the possible connotation that such correct behaviour 
would be normative. It is only correct relative to the standard of classic 
logic, and this standard (like any norm) is a non-absolute that is open 
for discussion (Schroyens, in press). In the case of the invalid arguments 
one could use the complement of the certainty rating as a measure of 
logical correctness. An equivalent procedure to evaluate the overall re-
lation between logical correctness and general ability consists in com-
puting a logic index as the difference between the certainty ratings of 
the valid versus invalid arguments. There is a positive correlation with 
general ability (r = .135). It did not reach statistical significance though 
(p = .182). 
experIment 2
Experiment 1 confirmed that the counter-example frequency effect is 
smaller in the context of valid versus invalid arguments. This finding is 
consistent with (i.e., derives from) the Gricean truth-assumption. The 
assumption’s implication that exceptions (i.e., TF cases) are impossible 
if a conditional were true, conflicts with background knowledge about 
the factually possible exceptions to the rule. Some people seem to ad-
here to the truth-assumption and inhibit the conflicting background 
knowledge.  This  consequently  results  in  smaller  counter-example 
frequency effects on the valid arguments as compared to the invalid 
arguments for which there is no such conflict (at least providedthe 
conditional is not interpreted as the bi-conditional if and only if). 
  Of course, the fact that there remains a reliable counter-example 
effect on the valid arguments shows that certainly not all people limit 
the problem space to the narrow confines of the possibilities delineated 
by assuming the conditional is true. The counter-example effect on 
the valid arguments (even though smaller than on invalid arguments) 
demonstrates that many people abandon the truth assumption and 
take their broader background knowledge into account to judge the 
certainty of the arguments. 
  Experiment 1 only yielded suggestive but not conclusive (i.e., sta-
tistically significant) evidence for a positive relation between general 
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Figure 1.
Argument-certainty ratings on the logically valid versus invalid arguments as a function of general aptitude, and counterexample 
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aptitude and logically correct performance. Though the results were 
in the expected direction, subjects with higher ability did not show a 
statistically reliably larger effect of logic (i.e., the truth assumption) by 
showing increased certainty ratings of the valid arguments and/or show-
ing decreased certainty ratings of the invalid arguments. Experiment 1 
used a relatively selective sample, though. All participants were stu-
dents in private colleges, that is, non-public secondary high schools 
that do not provide technical education but provide general education 
in preparation for higher education. The present study tried to remedy 
the restriction in the range of general aptitude by sampling from differ-
ent educational systems (i.e, both technical and general). Moreover, the 
Standard Raven Progressive Matrices does not distinguish well in the 
higher regions of general aptitude. We therefore decided to use a more 
extended battery of tests, using both measures of fluid and crystallised 
intelligence to obtain a measure of general aptitude. 
Method
ParticiPants 
Participants were 11th- and 12th-grade students (N = 245) at a 
secondary Flemish high school. Participating high schools were of two 
types. They either provide technical education or else provide general 
education in preparation of higher education. For both the 11th and 
12th grade, one class was drawn from a school for technical education 
and one class was drawn from a school for general education.
Design 
Participants received logically valid (MP, MT) or invalid (AC, DA) 
conditional inference problems with few or many counter-examples.   
A first between-groups factor was formed by a measure of general 
aptitude (low, medium, high). A second between-groups factor was 
formed by inviting participants to provide their evaluation of the con-
clusions asap (n = 116) or not stressing them (n = 129). 
Materials
conditional-inferences problems 
Participants evaluated the same 32 conditional arguments used in 
Experiment 1. The conclusions were evaluated on the following 5-point 
scale, ranging from very/somewhat uncertain to somewhat/very certain 
that the conclusion follows. The scale was repeated on the right-hand 
side of each of the numbered problems and participants ticked their 
response (A, B, etc) to this problem on a separate response sheet. 
  As in Experiment 1, the conditional-inference problems were 
part of a larger battery of reasoning problems. Before solving the prob-
lems of interest for the present study, participants first solved a set of 32 
syllogisms (i.e., problems based on premises with all, none, some) with 
believable or unbelievable conclusions. As in Experiment 1, the 11th- 
and 12th-grade students formed the young-adult reference group for 
a study in the development of human reasoning, which is a topic of 
interest that falls beyond the scope and focus of the present study and 
will be not discussed here. 
   About half the participants were invited to solve the problems 
as soon as possible (119 of the 249 11th- and 12th-grade students). 
Everything was identical to the non-speeded group, except that the 
speeded group read the following additional paragraph in the instruc-
tion to the different reasoning problems:“You have to try to solve the 
problems AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. This does not mean that you can 
fill in just anything. You have to select the answer you think is cor-
rect, but as fast as possible. This test more particularly probes for 
your  fast,  initial  ‘gut-response’  judgements  on  the  problems.”  The 
speeded-inference instructions were added for exploratory purposes 
(but see Schroyens, Schaeken, & Handley, 2003, for a rationale of using 
speeded-inference). 
Psychometric tests 
Participants  answered  three  sub-tests  (Analogies,  Figures,  and 
Words) of the Dutch Differentiële Aanleg Test (Differential Aptitude 
Test series, D.A.T.; Evers & Lucassen, 1991). The Analogies sub-test 
consists of 50 sentences of the following type “… stands for sweet such 
as lemon stands for … (a) school – car,  (b) work – hotel, (c) sugar – 
sour, (d) wood – fork, (e) eating – breakfast.” 
The  Figure-Series  test  is  analogous  to  the  Raven  Progressive 
Matrices and consists of 50 items. The Words test probes for the mean-
ing of 75 words. Participants are given a target word and have to select 
among a list of five answer alternatives the word that most closely 
matches the target word’s meaning. Participants also completed the 
Rationality-Experientiality inventory (REI; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
The REI consists of two sub-scales (Rationality, i.e., the original Need 
for Cognition scale, and Experientiality) which are measured by 20 
items (assertions) each. Participants have to indicate to what extent 
(1-5) they consider the assertions applicable to themselves, for instance 
“I generally prefer to accept things as they are rather than to question 
them.” The psychometric tests were completed in a 2-hr session and 
were passed in a fixed order and within a fixed time limit (25 min for 
the Figure Series, 20 min for the Analogies and 20 min for the Words 
test). The remaining time (15 min) was left to complete the REI. 
Results and discussion
The certainty ratings (1-5) were transformed to the [0, 1] probability 
interval and submitted to analyses of variance on the mean certainty 
ratings on the logically valid versus invalid inferences with few versus 
many counter-examples (see Figure 2). General aptitude (low, me-
dium, high; as determined by the 33rd and 66th percentile, cf. Experi-
ment 1) was introduced as a between-subjects variable in the ANOVA. 
The general aptitude score was computed as the proportion of correct 
responses to the Analogies, Figure Series, and Words tests. An equal 
weight was given to each of the three sub-tests. Table 2 presents the 
correlations between the different sub-tests, as well as the correlations 
with the Logic Index. This index is computed as the difference between 
the certainty ratings of the valid minus the invalid arguments. It thus 
corresponds to the logical-validity effect in the ANOVA. Preliminary 
analyses showed that the speeded-inference instruction did not show 
a main effect and did not interact significantly with any of the other 
variables (both in first, second, or third-order interactions). 
  Figure 2 presents the mean certainty ratings as a function of logi-
cal validity, counter-example frequency, and general aptitude.  As in AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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Experiment 1 (see Figure 1), Figure 2 clearly shows the well-known 
counter-example effects, F(1, 239) = 665.7, MSE = .0168, p < .000001. 
Both the valid and the invalid arguments are evaluated as less certain 
when there were many (vs. few) counter-examples to the conclusions, 
760 vs. .681, F(1, 239) =  70.3, MSE = .010,  p < .000001; and .823 
vs. .469, F(1, 239) =  944.1, MSE = .0159,  p < .000001, respectively. 
More interesting for the present discussion is the interaction between 
logical  validity  and  counter-example  frequency,  F(1,  239)  =  484.1, 
MSE = .0094,  p < .00001. Figure 2 shows that the counter-example
 effect on the valid arguments (.760 vs. .681: d = .079) is again smaller 
than the counter-example effect on the invalid argument (.823 vs. .469: 
d = .354). This concurs with the hypothesis that at least to start, people 
make a truth-assumption. As before, though people might start with 
the truth-assumption, the significant counter-example effect on the 
valid argument (d = .079 irrespective of it being smaller than in the 
invalid arguments) indicates that people often do not maintain the 
truth-assumption. They often seem to abandon the truth-assumption 
in favour of taking background knowledge into account. Not always 
Valid Invalid R E G Words Analogies Figures
r p r p r p r p r p r p r p r p
Logic index .437 .0007 -.509 <.0001 .172 .0072 -.157 .0146 .340 .0009 .283 .0002 .327 .0007 .227 .0007
Percentage valid .552 <.0001 .176 .0066 -.021 .7500 .227 .0006 .167 .0096 .220 .0019 .164 .0104
Percentage invalid .009 .8879 .126 .0505 -.098 .129 -.102 .1122 -.093 .147 -.053 .4063
Rationality (R) -.000 .9980 .267 .0006 .243 .0003 .292 <.0001 .116 .0706
Experientiality (E) -0.73 .254 -.102 .113 -.089 .167 .003 .9632
G .724 <.0001 .929 <.0001 .788 <.0001
Word lists .623 <.0001 .340 .0009
Analogies .569 <.0001
tAble 2. 
correlations Between reasoning Performance Metrics and Metrics of general Ability Metrics and cognitive style (experiment 2, N = 245).
Note. G is formed as the weighted sum total of scores on the Word-meaning, Analogies, and Figure-series tests.
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though, as indeed the counter-example effect is significantly smaller on 
valid versus invalid arguments. 
  Experiment  1  attempted  to  provide  converging  evidence  for 
the  primacy  of  the  truth-assumption  by  relating  ensuing  conflict 
resolution to general aptitude. It was hypothesized that participants 
with a higher general aptitude are more apt to resolve the conflict by 
inhibiting background knowledge that is inconsistent with the truth-
assumption. When assuming the conditional is true, exceptions to the 
rule are judged impossible. That is, the counterexamples to the valid 
arguments (i.e., the exceptions to the rule, a.k.a. disablers) are incon-
sistent with the truth-assumption. Figure 2 confirms the positive rela-
tion between general aptitude and logically correct reasoning, which 
is by definition reasoning on the basis of the truth-assumption. Table 
2 indicates that there is a significant positive correlation between the 
logic Index and General aptitude, r = .34, p < .0001.  The analyses of va-
riance accordingly yield a significant second-level interaction between 
general aptitude and the certainty ratings of the logically valid versus 
invalid arguments, F(2, 239) =  11.5, MSE = .0172, p < .00001. Table 
2 similarly shows a positive relation between Rationality (a.k.a. need 
for cognition) and deductive rationality, that is, the logic index. People 
who score high on the Rationality index are more likely to endorse the 
logical valid arguments. Endorsing these arguments involves resolving 
a conflict between the exceptions being (hypothetically) impossible 
while background knowledge informs us they are (factually) possible.
  Figure 2 shows that people with a higher general aptitude are 
less  likely  to  reject  the  logically  valid  arguments,  F(2,  239)  =  8.6, 
MSE = .038,  p < .001, whereas general aptitude does not affect cer-
tainty ratings of the invalid arguments, F < 0.5.  This is exactly what one 
expects when inhibition is related to general ability and background 
knowledge needs to be inhibited in the context of the valid arguments 
but not the invalid arguments. The absence of a general-ability effect 
on the invalid arguments suggests that it is not knowledge or access to 
background knowledge that is positively related to general aptitude. If 
this were the case than high ability people would show lower accept-
ability rating of the invalid arguments. And if it were (which seems 
plausible at first sight, cf. Verschueren et al., 2005), then this makes 
the theoretical import of a positive effect on the valid arguments even 
stronger. It would mean that despite increased knowledge of counter-
examples and/or increased ability to retrieve counter-examples the 
high-aptitude reasoners discount their larger knowledge base when it 
conflicts with the truth- assumption. The present findings thus suggest 
that general aptitude is not directly related to increased knowledge but 
is related to what one does with this factual knowledge. The relation 
between the Rationality subscale of the REI and logically valid reason-
ing (see Table 2) converges upon this conclusion. Having a particular 
competence is almost useless if one does not use it. This is trivial when 
phrased as such (use-less, vis-à-vis, non-use). One must also be moti-
vated to adopt and develop one’s talents and capacities in order to fulfil 
one’s potential. The Rationality Index taps into such a motivational need 
for cognition. Overall, findings are consistent with the central thesis 
that some people inhibit factual background in cases where it conflicts 
with the spontaneous assumption that given information is truthful.
General dIscussIon
The  present  study  investigated  the  importance  of  a  Gricean  truth-
assumption  as  regards  the  language  game  of  reasoning  under  cer-
tainty, that is, deductive rationality in human reasoning. Both studies 
presented evidence in favour of the Gricean truth-assumption. First, 
both studies showed smaller counter-example effects on the valid ver-
sus invalid, which lies at the basis of the main logical validity effects. 
The valid (vs. invalid) arguments are more likely to be endorsed than 
the logically invalid arguments, supposedly because following up the 
consequences of the hypothesized truth-assumption requires inhibi-
tion of the counter-examples to the valid but not the invalid arguments. 
Second, both studies provided suggestive evidence in favour of the hy-
pothesized inhibition of counter-examples. Such inhibition would be 
required in the context of the valid but not the invalid arguments and 
the results indeed showed that general ability (which makes execution 
of inhibitory processes easier and/or more likely) is positively related to 
the size of the logical validity effect.
  Our predictions for the Gricean truth-assumption were derived 
and specified without relying much on the specific details of one or 
other processing theory. Given the available evidence, however, the 
implication for extant theories of reasoning are rather straightforward. 
Those theories that subscribe to the truth assumption seem strength-
ened, whereas theories that do not, seem confronted with a set of more 
difficult-to-explain findings. In the following two sections we give an 
example of these two types of truth versus truthfulness-based theories. 
We then touch upon some wider theoretical and conceptual issues. We 
first present a brief consideration of the notion of truth (verity or strict 
truth) as compared to truthfulness (verisimilitude). This distinction is 
fundamental to the contrast between extant alternative theories of rea-
soning about conditionals. We subsequently consider the rational basis 
for the truth-assumption and end the general discussion by briefly 
considering the notion of deductive rationality. 
Truth-based interpretations          
of conditionals
Most  current  theories  of  human  reasoning  presume  the  truth-as-
sumption. This is not very surprising when one considers that truth 
is primordial to falsity: Non-truth presumes truth. “Though Truth 
and Falsehood bee Neare twins, yet Truth a little elder is.” (Donne, 
1635/1930, p. 129, cited in Gilbert, 1991). The mental-model theory 
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) is the single one theory that is most 
explicit in invoking the truth-assumption (Johnson-Laird, 1983). It 
forms the basis of the truth-principle as regards the representation 
of conditionals. The truth principle states that “each mental model of 
a set of assertions represents a possibility given the truth of the asser-
tions” (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002, p. 653). This truth-principle is 
misrepresented when stating, as one sometimes sees claimed in the 
literature, that people only represent true possibilities to suggest that 
people initially only represent possibilities that make the conditional 
true. The truth-principle is not a categorical claim about cases that 
make the conditional true (i.e., when reasoning about the conditional). AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002) are very explicit in claiming that truth 
judgements are distinct from judgements about possibilities: 
Each entry in a truth table represents the truth or falsity of an asser-
tion given a particular possibility. In contrast, each mental model 
in a set represents a possibility. A corollary is that possibilities are 
psychologically basic, not truth values. Discourse about the truth 
or falsity of propositions is at a higher level than mere descriptions 
of possibilities. (p. 653)
The truth-principle is a conditional claim about what is represented 
as possible, when reasoning from conditionals, that is, when reasoning 
from the assumption that the conditional is true. The representation 
of possibilities (i.e., mental models of such possibilities) is conditional 
upon the assumption that the proposition is true. True possibilities 
are, by definition, the states of affairs that are possible, given that the 
proposition is true. 
Mental-model theory proffers that by default people start reason-
ing from the assumed truth (vs. truthfulness) of a proposition. That 
is, using Gilbert’s (1991) classification, mental-model theory defends a 
“Spinozan system”. In Spinozan systems a strict belief in the truth of the 
conditional is the default. This strict belief can subsequently be “proba-
bilified” (to use Morris & Sloutsky’s, 1998, term) by taking exceptions 
to the rule into account. In so-called ‘Cartesian systems’ it works the 
other way round. That is, a fuzzy probabilistic belief in the conditional 
is the default, though this subjective belief can be “upgraded” to strict 
belief P(q|p) = 1 by discounting exceptions to the rule. In the following 
section we illustrate how the present evidence in favour of the Gricean 
truth-assumption  seems  problematical  for  conditional-probability 
theories that proffer a Cartesian belief system in which it is assumed 
people start reasoning by default from their non-strict belief in the 
truthfulness (i.e., subjective probability) of the conditional. 
Truthfulness-based interpretations 
of conditionals 
Conditional-probability theories (e.g., Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford, 
Chater, & Larkin, 2000) are a class of theories that seem to have diffi-
culty incorporating the Gricean truth-assumption. They do not seem to 
distinguish true from false utterances. There are only degrees of falsity 
or truth (i.e., probabilities). This restriction to factual truth (truthful-
ness or verisimilitude vs. truth or verity) is problematical because there 
is enough evidence showing that people can reason hypothetically and 
deductively. Schroyens and Schaeken (2003) have indeed shown that 
the conditional-probability model of conditional reasoning is deficient 
because it is purely probabilistic, that is, belief-based in nature (see also 
Oaksford & Chater, 2003). 
An observation that is problematical for conditional-probability 
theories is that some people seem to make the truth-assumption with-
out being instructed to do so. Moreover, our findings show that it is 
particularly people with higher general ability that seem more conse-
quential in making the truth-assumption. The logical-validity effect 
that follows from the truth-assumption is observed even though rea-
soners are not instructed to reason logically and/or are not instructed 
to assume the conditional premise is true. This is an important dif-
ference with reasoning tasks that are explicitly deductive in nature. 
In such deduction studies participants are (and need to be; cf. Evans, 
2002) instructed to assume the premises are true. Indeed, at first sight, 
conditional-probability theories have little difficulty in explaining an 
effect of stressing the truth-assumption in such deduction studies.
For instance, Schroyens (2004) instructed participants that they had 
to assume the conditional was true even if it might in fact not be strictly 
true. Under these conditions the logical-validity effect increased as 
compared to when there was no mention of assuming the conditional 
to be true. Phrased within the scope of conditional-probability theory, 
stressing the truth has the simple consequence that the subjective belief 
in the conditional if p then q (i.e., conditional-probability of q, given p) 
is set to 1: There are no exceptions to the rule. The normal contextual 
relativity of the conditional claim is blocked by imposing the truth-
assumption. The effect of stressing the truth-assumption (Schroyens, 
2004) is theoretically informative only to the extent that it shows that 
the truth-assumption has the predicted import on the logical validity 
effect and strengthens an effect that is also present when people are 
reasoning in a normal context that does not invite them explicitly to 
constrain their beliefs to an artificially created context. The smaller 
size of the counter-example effects on the valid versus invalid argu-
ments suggests that people do not reason simply on the basis of factual 
knowledge and/or their subjective belief in the conditional. That is, the 
contextual relativity of conditionals does not seem to be primordial.
  Consider  the  conditional-probability model (Oaksford  et al., 2000) 
in which the MP and AC endorsement rates are a direct function of the 
conditional probability of the conclusion, given the categorical premise.
  P(MP) = P(q|p)
  P(AC) = P(p|q)
These  functions  are  easily  reformulated  as  a  function  of  counter-
examples:
  P(MP) = 1 – P(~q|p)
  P(AC) = 1 – P(~p|q)
Assuming that P(q|p) = P(p|q), it follows that P(MP) must be equal to 
P(AC). Both experiments show that this is not the case and that the MP 
rates are higher than the AC certainty ratings. 
  Of course, to undercut the falsified prediction, conditional-prob-
ability theory might rebut that the assumption is not satisfied and that 
P(q|p) is larger than P(p|q). This is possible, but certainly very unlikely 
given the experimental control of our studies. First, the stimulus mate-
rials used in Experiments 1 and 2 are closely matched on the saliency 
and frequency of p and ~q (a.k.a. exceptions or disablers) and ~p and 
q (a.k.a. alternatives). De Neys et al. (2002) already reported summary 
statistics indicating that the alternatives and exceptions we used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 are comparable in their average frequency, plausi-
bility, and salience. (Salience is computed as the proportion of subjects 
who generate the most frequently generated alternative or exception.) 
The conditional probabilities are directly related to the likelihood of the 
exceptions and alternatives and, indeed, the conditional probabilities 
are not basic. As noted by Ohm and Thompson (2006): 
These  probabilities,  however,  are  not  explanatory  constructs. 
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mination of one or more underlying representational processes. … 
For example … Thus, it seems likely that probability estimates may 
be mediated by the availability of instances of the form p and ~q, or 
~p and q, that come to mind. (p. 272) 
Given the close matching of the availability of the p and not-q and not-p 
and q cases, though not impossible, there is thus certainly little room to 
argue P(q|p) has been systematically higher than P(p|q).
  The logical validity effect, which is grounded on the smaller effect 
of counter-examples to the logically valid arguments, shows that the 
argument certainty ratings and/or endorsement rates are not merely 
a function of their conditional probabilities. Conditional-probability 
theories need to invoke additional processes to explain the findings. 
We argued that such processes are related to a Gricean truth-assump-
tion that people would spontaneously make when given information 
they are invited to reason from. Assuming at least to start that given 
information is true, there is a conflict between the exceptions to the 
rule being impossible if the rule were true, on the one hand, and the 
exceptions to the rule being factual possibilities, on the other hand. At 
least some people seem to make the Gricean truth-assumption spon-
taneously. Making and adhering to the truth-assumption results in 
reducing the potential impact of exceptions to the rule.  Indeed, when 
the rule is assumed to be true there are no exceptions to the rule. 
  The effect of the truth-assumption (i.e., inhibition of exceptions 
to the rule) is within the grasp of conditional-probability theories, at 
least apparently so. These theories have difficulty though in explain-
ing why people seem to make the Gricean truth-assumption in the 
first place (i.e., why it is “Gricean” in nature). Indeed, probabilistic 
subjective-believability and not absolute truth is considered to be the 
default and primary in human reasoning. Moreover, the present results 
further constrain any amendment to conditional-probability theories 
in giving body to an algorithmic level specification of the simple (too 
simple)  computational  model  proffered  by  Oaksford  et  al.  (2000): 
Especially higher general-ability people seem susceptible to inhibiting 
background knowledge that is inconsistent with the hypothetical truth 
of the conditional one is reasoning from (vs. about). 
An implicit versus explicit       
truth-assumption 
We found support for the thesis that at least some people make the 
truth-assumption and actually stick to it. The logical validity effect 
indicates  that  counter-examples  to  valid  arguments  are  given  less 
weight. It remains the case, however, that the majority of people will 
abandon the truth-assumption. The sizable counter-example effects 
one observes on the logically valid inferences evidence this. One can 
only claim that the truth-assumption is abandoned when it is made in 
the first place. The question that then arises is whether those people 
who do not follow the truth-assumption (by taking factual knowledge 
to the contrary into account) actually made it in the first place.
  The idea that people initially and implicitly make the assumption 
that the proposition they are confronted with is true, is in accordance 
with the Gricean maxims of conversation: We generally assume/ensure 
that our or the speaker’s contribution is truthful, relevant and as in-
formative as possible, though not more detailed than required by the 
context (Grice, 1975; see also Levinson, 2000). Or, as noted by Gupta 
and Belnap (1993): 
In more recent times, Gottlob Frege, Frank Ramsey, and others 
have made the related observation that the sentence that p is true 
had the same meaning as p – that the addition of the truth predicate 
does not contribute any new content to the sentence p. (p. 1)
The truth-assumption is an implicit assumption (see e.g., Schroyens, 
1997; Schroyens et al., 1996, 1999). It is partly because it is an implicit 
assumption that it is easily abandoned. The rational basis of the truth-
assumption can be found in the idea of bounded rationality or cogni-
tive economy. There is a representational cost attached to considering 
all possibilities, both true and false. 
Verity and verisimilitude
In the General Introduction section we suggested that defeating or 
suppressing a valid argument can simply mark the abandonment of 
the hypothetical-truth assumption (see also Politzer & Braine, 1991). 
Theorists arguing against (mental) logic theories contest that ques-
tioning the literal truth of, for example, If it is a bird, then it can fly is 
involved in defeasible reasoning: “Surely [this] mischaracterizes peo-
ple’s cognitive attitude towards this and a million other commonsense 
generalizations” (Oaksford & Chater, 1998, p. 5). This rhetorical claim 
as regards the truthfulness of strictly speaking false conditionals misses 
its target because it is not congruent with reality. We ran an additional 
study to address this issue. We do not need to allocate much space to 
present this study in its usual format (i.e., laboriously and by giving a 
Method section with Procedure, Design…). Indeed, we simply asked 
44 first-year psychology students to evaluate whether the conditional 
“If it is a bird, then it can fly” is “true or false,” while at the same time 
we told them – translated from Dutch –  ”to think about the fact that 
for instance ostriches and penguins are also birds (and can not fly).”   
Thirty-eight of them (86%) judged the conditional to be false. In short, 
the factual falsity of the conclusion Tweety the ostrich can fly licenses 
the conclusion that If it is a bird, then it can fly is a false utterance. 
  To ground the core argument against “mental logic,” Oaksford 
and Chater (1998) appeal to the, for many people comforting, idea that 
there is true common-sense knowledge. 
If our commonsense descriptions of the world and of ourselves are 
not candidates for truth then precious little else of what we call our 
commonsense knowledge of the world will be candidates for truth. 
We would then be in the paradoxical position of having to provide 
a system of human inference that is always based on false premises 
but which is nonetheless apparently capable of guiding successful 
action in the world! (Oaksford & Chater, 1998, p. 5) 
There is really only an apparent contradiction. It is not that prob-
lematical that there is precious little (if any) knowledge that is strictly 
true. The fact that some birds do not fly does not make it senseless to 
use the generalization that birds fly. An absolute truth is universally 
applicable, but if something is not universally applicable then this does 
not imply that the idea is inapplicable and useless. It might be inap-
plicable (applicable to none) or applicable to some (but not all). The AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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demonstrable fact that most of our common-sense generalizations are 
false (i.e., not strictly true), marks that they only have a certain de-
gree of truth: They are false, but applicable (or “assertible”; see Adams, 
1975). Verity is not verisimilitude. Rips (2001) already highlighted that 
there is a world of possibilities between something being absolutely 
false (i.e., having a probability of 0) and being absolutely true (and hav-
ing a probability of 1).  
Deductive rationality: Adaptively 
rational 
The idea that people at least sometimes exhibit deductively rational 
behaviour has become a controversial thesis. In recent years, the first 
author has argued however that the “probabilistic turn” (Oaksford & 
Chater, 2007) is in danger of making an overturn, irrespective of it 
having provided a valuable contribution to the literature in correct-
ing “logicist” preconceptions about what human rationality is about. 
It seems that the same theorists who critiqued so-called mental logi-
cians for their “reasoning imperialism” (Rips, 2001) as regards deduc-
tive logic have become reasoning imperialists in advancing “mental 
Bayesianism” as the absolute standard of human rationality. We cer-
tainly do not defend a strong version of mental logic, but defend the 
thesis that deductively rational behaviour can be adaptively rational.  
In our view (Schroyens, 2009, in press), deductive rationality is a 
form  of  adaptively  rational  behaviour  (Anderson,  1990) where the 
human processing system adapts itself to the context and goals of de-
ductive reasoning under certainty. The first step in a so-called rational 
analysis is indeed to “specify precisely the goals of the cognitive system” 
(Chater, Oaksford, Nakisa, & Redington, 2003, p. 69). Given the notion 
of adaptively rational behaviour – where, by definition, rationality is 
determined as a function of the context and current processing goals of 
the system – one can never use rationality in an absolute and unquali-
fied sense. Rationality is relative to the adaptive context and processing 
goals of the inferential system. This also means that the observation 
that people can reason deductively does not imply the evaluative stance 
that people should (in an absolute, context-independent and non-rela-
tivistic sense) reason deductively and neither does it imply that people 
would always exhibit deductively rational behaviour in common-sense 
reasoning (see Mandel, 2000, for a discussion of “conceptual blur in the 
rationality debate”). 
  In common-sense reasoning about ordinary language expres-
sions and beliefs such as If Tweety is a healthy and mature bird, then 
Tweety can fly, there are many practical issues that often prevent people 
from setting the goal of making deductively valid arguments. In other 
words, deductively rational behaviour is often very impractical. Critical 
thinking and reflectiveness does not always serve our daily purposes 
(see e.g., Baron, 1990; Duemler & Mayer, 1988; Holt, 1999; Shugan, 
1980). It would be infelicitous to act only upon inferences that follow 
necessarily. Plausible or likely inferences, though not necessarily true, 
can be helpful in informing and guiding actions: 
When faced with the ubiquitous sabre-toothed tiger of which arm-
chair evolutionists are so fond, the reasoner does not want to hang 
around working through some hellish normative theory: He or she 
wants to act, and fast. On the other hand, back in the safety of the 
cave it makes sense to evaluate in a reliable and communicable way 
the consequences of a decision to act, so that the individual and 
his or her social group can learn from the event. (Ormerod, 1997, 
p. 183)
The present study set out to investigate the general thesis that hu-
man thinking and reasoning contains the seeds required to exhibit de-
ductive rational behaviour. One central aspect of deductively rational 
behaviour is hypothetical reasoning under the assumption of truth. 
Experiments 1 and 2 provided evidence that corroborates the idea 
of such reasoning under the assumption of truth. The results further 
suggest that especially people with higher cognitive ability seem to 
be susceptible to spontaneously exhibiting such deductively rational 
reasoning. 
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appendIx a
 Table A presents items used in Experiments 1 and 2 and their grouping 
as items with relatively few versus many exceptions and/or alternatives. 
The item characteristics are not those obtained by the pre-tests con-
ducted on these Dutch stimuli by De Neys et al. (2003) or Verschueren 
et al. (2005). They represent the results of a new validation study in the 
same population Experiment 1 and 2 was run in. That is, 11th-12th 
grade students (n = 21) generated alternatives and another group of 26 
students of the same high-school generated exceptions to the rules. The 
alternatives and exceptions questionnaire was identical to the one used 
by Verschueren et al. That is, participants were instructed to generate 
up to five conceptually distinct alternatives or exceptions and were 
asked to rate the likelihood of each of the alternatives (alternatively 
exceptions) on a 7-point scale going from 1 (occurs almost never) to 7 
(occurs very often) over 4 (occurs sometimes). Salience is computed as 
the proportion of subjects who generated the most frequently gener-
ated alternative or exception.
                                                                                                                                          Exceptions Alternatives
G F P S G F P S
If the match is struck, then it lights. Many 2.10 4.98 55.6 Few 1.33 4.17 100
If the correct switch is flipped, then the porch light goes on. Many 2.62 4.58 90.0 Few 1.74 4.04 25.0
If water is heated to 100°C, then it boils. Few 0.76 4.27 33.3 Few 1.22 3.65 21.1
If one cuts ones finger, then one bleeds. Few 1.57 4.68 50.0 Few 1.91 4.61 28.6
If fertilizer is put on plants, then they grow quickly. Many 2.14 4.78 52.6 Many 1.83 4.95 33.3
If one turns on the air conditioner, then one feels cool.  Many 2.14 4.75 55.0 Many 1.96 4.65 38.1
If one jumps into the swimming pool, then one gets wet. Few 1.76 4.37 94.4 Many 2.30 5.22 68.2
If the apples are ripe, then they fall from the tree. Few 1.60 3.63 26.3 Many 2.05 4.41 57.1
tAble A1. 
Average number of Alternatives and exceptions (Frequency [F]), their Average Plausibility (P) and salience (s), and grouping (g) as 
items With relatively Few versus Many exceptions and/or Alternatives.AdvAnces in cognitive Psychology reseArch Article
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appendIx B
Appendix  B  presents  the  basic  certainty  ratings  of  the  logically 
valid  (MP,  MT)  and  logically  invalid  (AC,  DA)  arguments  about 
conditionals  with  few  or  many  alternatives  and/or  exceptions 
(a.k.a.  disablers)  observed  in  the  standard  designs  used  in 
Experiments 1 and 2. All certainty ratings were obtained by trans-
forming  the  selected  evaluation  on  the  5-point  or 
7-point  evaluation  scales  to  the  uniform  [0,1]  probability 
intervals.
Alternatives
Many exceptions Few exceptions
Argument Many Few Many Few
MP 0.741 0.877 0.748 0.922
AC 0.552 0.434 0.762 0.847
MT 0.559 0.705 0.531 0.814
DA 0.530 0.412 0.792 0.860
tAble b1. 
Basic  certainty  ratings  as  a  Function  of  Few  or  Many 
exceptions  and/or  Alternatives  to  the  conditional  relation 
(experiment 1, N = 100).
tAble b2. 
Basic certainty ratings as a Function of the Frequency of exceptions and/or Alternatives (experiment 2).
Many exceptions Many exceptions Few exceptions Few exceptions
Many alternatives Few alternatives Many alternatives Few alternatives
Argument Argument Argument Argument
Instruction MP MT AC DA MP MT AC DA MP MT AC DA MP MT AC DA
Standard (n = 129) .793 .526 .492 .436 .763 .671 .789 .796 .847 .605 .499 .458 .870 .786 .878 .833
Speeded (n = 116) .763 .517 .467 .415 .739 .678 .773 .796 .813 .540 .504 .478 .838 .772 .863 .833
Mean .779 .522 .480 .426 .752 .674 .781 .796 .831 .574 .502 .468 .855 .779 .871 .833